The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe has delivered an important judgment on the route available to parties aggrieved by disciplinary decisions made under registered employment codes of conduct. In Delta Beverages (Private) Limited v Mufaro Muchetu SC 52/26, handed down on 28 August 2026, the Court confirmed that a party dissatisfied with the outcome of disciplinary proceedings may proceed directly to the Labour Court under section 92D of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01], and is not first required to approach a labour officer under section 101(5).
The decision is significant because it settles an important procedural question arising from the 2023 amendments to the Labour Act and gives clearer guidance on how employers and employees should approach appeals arising from disciplinary proceedings.
Background to the dispute
The respondent, Mr. Mufaro Muchetu, was employed by Delta Beverages as a machine operator and was subject to the company’s registered Employment Code of Conduct. He was charged with an alcohol-related offence after allegedly performing his duties while under the influence of alcohol. Following disciplinary proceedings, he was found guilty and dismissed. His internal appeal to the Works Council was unsuccessful.
He thereafter appealed directly to the Labour Court, challenging the decision to uphold dismissal and contending that insufficient weight had been given to his mitigating circumstances. Delta Beverages objected to the Labour Court’s jurisdiction, arguing that the employee was obliged first to appeal to a labour officer under section 101(5) of the Labour Act before approaching the Labour Court.
The Labour Court rejected that objection and held that an aggrieved party could elect either to approach a labour officer or proceed directly to the Labour Court. Delta Beverages appealed that ruling to the Supreme Court.
The central legal issue
The Supreme Court was required to determine two main questions:
(a) whether section 101(5) compels an aggrieved party to approach a labour officer before appealing to the Labour Court; and
(b) whether section 92D had been impliedly repealed by the later enactment of section 101(5).
These questions arose because both provisions use the word “may” and both appear, at first sight, to offer an avenue of redress following disciplinary proceedings under a registered code of conduct.
What the Supreme Court decided
The Supreme Court held that the two provisions create distinct and complementary remedies.
Section 92D gives an aggrieved employer or employee a direct right of appeal to the Labour Court against a determination made under an employment code. The Court described this as a residual appellate mechanism intended to ensure that parties are not left without a remedy following disciplinary proceedings.
Section 101(5), on the other hand, allows an aggrieved party to approach a labour officer within 30 days after the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. But the Court was clear that this is not an appeal in the conventional adjudicative sense. Once approached, the labour officer must attempt conciliation under section 93 or exercise other powers available under that provision.
The distinction was therefore critical: the Labour Court hears and determines an appeal on the merits, while a labour officer under section 101(5) essentially facilitates conciliation and, if necessary, the statutory dispute-resolution process that may lead to arbitration.
The Court emphasised that a labour officer is not an appellate tribunal and has no jurisdiction to redetermine the merits of a disciplinary matter already determined under a registered code of conduct.
No requirement to exhaust the labour officer route
One of the most important aspects of the judgment is the Court’s rejection of the argument that a party must first “exhaust domestic remedies” by approaching a labour officer. The Supreme Court held that section 101(5) does not create a mandatory domestic remedy which must be exhausted before a party can approach the Labour Court. Instead, it creates an alternative route aimed primarily at conciliation.
The Court therefore confirmed that an aggrieved party may elect:
- to appeal directly to the Labour Court under section 92D; or
- to approach a labour officer under section 101(5) for conciliation and the dispute-resolution process contemplated in section 93.
The Court described these as complementary avenues rather than competing or hierarchical remedies. Section 92D was not impliedly repealed. The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that section 101(5), having been enacted later, impliedly repealed section 92D.The Court found no inconsistency between the provisions. Section 92D remains the provision that confers appellate jurisdiction upon the Labour Court, while section 101(5) provides an alternative pathway to conciliation.
Why the decision matters
For employers, the judgment confirms that disciplinary determinations under registered codes of conduct may be taken directly to the Labour Court. Employers should therefore assume that disciplinary records may be subjected to appellate scrutiny without an intervening conciliation process.
This places renewed importance on the quality of disciplinary proceedings themselves. Charge sheets, evidence, procedural fairness, reasons for conviction and, importantly, the justification for the penalty imposed should all be properly documented. An employer cannot safely assume that defects in a disciplinary process will first be filtered through a labour officer.
For employees, the decision confirms that section 101(5) does not remove the direct right of appeal to the Labour Court. Employees may select the route that best suits the nature of the dispute. Where the complaint concerns the correctness of the disciplinary finding, interpretation of a code or the proportionality of dismissal, a direct appeal to the Labour Court may be the more appropriate course. Where the parties remain open to settlement, conciliation under section 101(5) may offer a more cost-effective and less adversarial route.
From a litigation-management perspective, parties must also be alert to the different time periods applicable to the two avenues. The Supreme Court noted that an appeal under section 92D is subject to the applicable Labour Court time limit, while section 101(5) permits recourse to a labour officer within 30 days following completion of disciplinary proceedings. Selecting the correct route, and doing so within the prescribed period, remains critical.
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